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;ince military procurement is accomplished by the use of
public funds, the question of how the procurement is done is of
vital importance to the public interest* Such procurement is
accomplished in a business environment in which prices are the
result of a number of complex forces which do not necessarily
result in the traditional concept of market prices. Market
prices have been conceived of as bein^ reasonable because
competition has set the upper limitations of self-interest . 1
Since very little military procurement is purchased under
conditions of a market price, it behooves us to look for other
measurements of the reasonableness of prices.
For example, in F.Y. 1967 (July-September) out of a total
of £3.4 billion of direct purchases within the Department of the
Navy, almost $2.3 billion was negotiated compared to $.6 billion
purchased through advertising. 2 It is for this reason that the
negotiation process is examined as an alternative device.
lu
. 3. Jepartment of jefense. Jefense 1 rocureaent -. _
. Army fU 36-3, I i . Navy NAVKAT F-12410, . :. Air Force
AFP 70-1-O, jefense Supply Agency J3AH 4105.1, 1 July 196$, VIII,
PP. 1-3.
2\J. S. Department of the Navy, Headquarters. Navnl Material
Command, Survey of Procurement statistics . NAVMAT F-4200,
September 19o6.

Reasonableness of prices can be assured only when established
and applied by reasonable men who intend to examine all the
pertinent circumstances of the procurement. Negotiation Joes
not assure but rather provides the opportunity of reasonable
consideration and thus can be used as a pricing method to serve
the best interests of the public.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper will be to examine the research
question of how incentive contracting can provide the means for
negotiating an agreement whereby both parties have the
opportunity for optimising their interests.
In the course of examining the research question it will be
necessary to evaluate and consider related questions involving
the concept, process and organisation of negotiation and its
interrelationship with incentive contracting. Subsidiary
questions will be considered as follows:
1. What factors should be considered in pre-planning and
planning the negotiation session?
2. What types of analytical tools are available to the
government negotiators and how can they be used effective!
3. How are government objectives established and
strategies executed to reach the negotiation objective?
4* Joes incentive contracting provide the element of
flexibility sometimes needed to reach a mutually satisfactory
agreement?
5. What part does trade-off annlysis play in providing an

opportunity for both parties to optimise their interests?
6. What is the relationship between cost reliability and
incentive contracting?
It is not the purpose of this paper to examine all of the
various types of incentive contracts used by the government.
This paper will therefore be limited to discussion of a multiple
incentive contract in the pre-planning negotiation phase
followed by the use of a fixed-price incentive contract in a
hypothetical negotiation session.
Approach
The process of negotiation, in its broadest aspects, deals
with activities concerning fact-finding, analysis, planning,
communication and strategy which are interrelated with the
parties' personal skills, attitude and teamwork. The approach
used in this paper will be to develop an understanding of the
concept, process and organisation of procurement by negotiation
through the evaluation of these activities*
The concept and use of incentive type contracts will be
examined in order to establish a relationship with the
negotiation process. The use of a fixed-price incentive
contract will be compared to other :oajor types of government
contracts in order to place it in its proper perspective.
Next, the activities and factors involved in the
preparation and planning for the -iation session will be
discussed. Factors concerning the procurement situation and
the contractor's proposal will be analysed. With the

centralisation of the audit function and the partial
centralisation of the contract administration function by
Jecretary KcMamara, the contracting officer must often look to
these new organisations for information and assistance in
planning the negotiation session. The approach to be used in
t.J.3 paper will be to view certain inputs from such activities
as they apply to a hypothetical procurement situation. The
need for planning a negotiation objective as well as other
positions will be examined. Reasonable approaches to the
establishment of such objectives and positions will be explored.
The use of trade-off analysis will be considered as a means of
evaluating the contract* s essential incentivised elements. By
fragmentising the elements of the contractor's proposal into
issues the contracting officer will be better equipped to plan
his strategy. The variables inherent in planning strategy and
the importance of flexibility will be investigated.
Finally , a discussion will be made of the area which this
writer feels to be the essential evaluation of the whole
negotiation process; namely, the negotiation session. At this
point the culmination of all of the pre-planning factors will
ultimately determine the level of performance in reaching
reasonable solutions. The use of the exploratory session and
the establishment of an agenda will be considered as methods
contributing toward the attainment of mutual agreement. A
hypothetical situation will be discussed in h the parties,
unable to reach agreement on a firm-fixed price contract, turn
to a fixed-price incentive contract as an alternative solution.

mthodoiofly
The method of presentation will consist of qualitative
discussion of negotiation techniques unaer variable situations
tarough the pre-planning and planning stages* The negotiation
techniques will then be related to the use of multiple
incentive and fixed-price incentive features for purposes of
illustrating the extent in wnich the planning phase is subject
to quantitative analysis* Graphs and charts are used where
appropriate In order to illustrate the techniques more clearly*
Research has primarily consisted of gathering information
from government publications and interviews with personnel
involved in government contract negotiation and administration*
Library research of non-government publications and articles
was U88U primarily to gain further insight into those areas
concerning negotiation, strategy, decision-making and group
behavior* Personal knowledge acquired from formal schooling i
contract administration and experience gained in price-cost
analysis was also a contributing factor*
Concept of Negotiation
In military procurement the term, negotiation, has a rather
loose meaning* In general it means any pricing method other
than advertised procurement .3 A'ne concept of negotiation needs
to be examined in its broader aspect so that the true nature of
tais tool of price determination can be studied more precisely*
3jefense i rocurement Handbook, op. clt. . XX. pp* 1-2*

Gordon '.aue Rule defines negotiation in hie book, "The Art of
Negotiation '• , as "a peaceable procedure for reconciling, and/or
compromising known differences". The definition provided by the
. Air Force ichool of Jystems and Logistics is a little more
explicit in defining negotiation as "a tool of decision-making
by two parties or groups who represent opposed viewpoints or
interests concerning the subject matter at issue, but who are
also interested in reaching a meeting of minds for a certain
period of time by a specialised process of communication called
bargaining"
•
In price negotiation the buyer and seller have opposed
interests concerning the level of the price* A negotiator who
does not understand the nature of the interest he represents or
is not willing to defend such interest to his utmost capability
should be disqualified as a negotiator. Mutual agreement in the
end can be satisfactory to both parties only when the differences
of viewpoints are thoroughly aired in the process. If it is
understood by either party that negotiation is essentially a
process of "giving in", he is thereby thinking in terms of
sacrificing his interests* Negotiation is not a process of
mutual sacrifice for the sake of agreement. Rather, it is a
process of finding a formula whereby both parties will have the
opportunity to have their interests optimised. One approach is
by bringing out prominently, the common advantages to both
parties of any proposal, and linking these advantages so that
tney appear equally balanced to the parties concerned.
Of course if the negotiators* objectives are very close or

even coincide, their task of reaching agreement is thereby
greatly simplified. However, there may be significant
differences between the objectives of both parties in which case
tue element of flexibility becomes an important determinant in
obtaining concessions leading to a satisfactory agreement *^ One
approach in using flexibility as a tool of negotiation is
incentive contracting*
The i rocoas of elation
It is not enough to say that the negotiation process is
that of communicating arounu a negotiation table* The scope of
the negotiator's activities is much broader and more inclusive.
In its broadest aspects the activities center around two main
divisions: (1) pre-negotiation planning and (2) negotiation*
5
The first includes the activities of fact-finding, analysis, and
planning; the second, executing the plan at the negotiation
table, involving mostly the skills of communication and carrying
out strategy*
re-negotiation activities shoul d be started as soon as
requirements are known to establish a procurement plan. At this
point fact-finding has started. Certain facts are necessary at
this point so that a thorough job can be done when planning the
requests for proposals* When the proposals are received and
certain potential contractors are selected, assignments for fact
Gordon '». Rule. "The Art of Negotiation", (unpublished,
private printing 1962)
, pp. 5-S*
5jefense Procurement Handbook, op. cit. . IX, pp* 33-37.

6gathering and analysis should be made* Team members should
receive definite assignments. The information to bo obtained
and the sources should be planned* Management of the fact-
finding process is important, for it is at this point that m
time and effort can ultimately be saved in the exploratory
session during negotiations*
In the case of forward pricing contracts, pertinent
information is usually in terms of the procurement situation,
the anticipated terms and conditions of the contract, total
price comparisons* historical cost data of the company involved
or costs of similar projects performed by other contractors*
Proper use of price/cost analysis discourages "haggling" and
vides an essential basis for adequate negotiation* Haggling
aims at price reduction for its own sake; negotiation aims at
determining a fair and reasonable price*"
With the advent of Project 00 where the audit function of
the individual services became centralised under the Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and much of their contract
administration functions were consolidated under the Defense
Contract Administration Services (DCAS), the procurement
contracting ofi'icer finds that he may now request assistance
from either source, or both, covering almost all phases of
contracting* When analysis has been completed in terms of
projections, the pre-negotiation team is ready to nake specific
&U* 3* Department of the Navy. Office of Naval Material,
Negotiators Handbook . NAV LX05 P-10OL, March 195*, IV, pp. 1-5.

plans for the meeting with the chosen contractor.
The Urbanization of Mogotiatlon
The level of performance of a negotiation depends upon
personal skills, attitudes and teamwork. As stated previously,
the skills of fact-finding and data-analysation are of
paramount importance to perform negotiation on a professional
level. No team can hope to attain any degree of sophistication
in its performance unless the planning for the use of facts has
been given maximum consideration from all aspects. This
involves a thorough knowledge of the contract specifications;
the applicability and appropriateness of various incentive
structures, as well as trade-off analysis .7
In spite of such preparations, negotiation performance may
still be on a less than desired level unless idual team
members exhibit attitudes which contribute toward reasonable
solutions. Kor purposes of this paper, it is assumed that a
group goal lias been carefully and clearly stated and that each
member has subordinated personal goals to that of the team*
Clovis R. Shephard in his book, "Small Groups; Some Sociological
Perspectives" states, "Generally a successful group has clear
objectives, not vague ones, and the members of the group have




The organization Tor negotiation management is the
negotiation team, composed of men who have duties in other
^anisational structures. owever, once the team has been
organised each man has an assigned function with the chief
negotiator as the manager* His management functions occur
in two areas: the management of fact-finding and the management
of negotiations which implicitly requires the organising of
facts and Lue handling of man*
ncept and Use of Incentive Type Contracts
Incentive type c~ it otj should, when properly structured,
reward the contractor by increasing nis profit if costs are
reduced and proauct performance and delivery improved, and
penalise him by reducing the profit if costs increase and product
performance and delivery goals are not met* It should be noted,
however, that product performance and delivery incentives fall
under the category of multiple incentive contracts, and should
be used only when improvement over stated minimum acceptable
performance or delivery terms has a measurable worth to the
government
•
Use of incentive contracting in the government is predicated
on several assumptions* First, there are risks for both parties
in the government-industry contractual relationship, just as
there are in private business* Second, both parties are ;oing
to assess the risks and determine for thenselves whether they
can afford to take those risks* Lastly, financial gain is the
prime objective of the private party to the government contract*
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Incentive contracts are an attempt to harness the drive for
financial gain under risk conditions, and make it work in the
arena of government contracting. The profit motive is therefore
the essence of incentive contracting.**
There are other important factors besides profit that the
negotiator for the government must consider. 9 The contractor's
interests may lie in gaining future business. He may desire to
increase profits on existing contracts by absorbing a portion of
the fixed overhead expense which ultimately results in increasing
the profit margin under those contracts. Other considerations
may be such factors as contributing to and improving the nation's
defense posture, gaining prestige and goodwill, retaining and
maintaining an engineering or production capability or excelling
for the sake of excellence. Such factors are not readily
susceptible to quantification and normally involve purely
intuitive judgments. These factors should be considered to the
extent possible in the pre-award stage but excluded from the
incentive structure incorporated into the provisions of the
contract. However, such factors should be considered prior
^Interviews with William J. Ryan, Head, Planning Branch.
Director Chief Naval Material, Procurement, November 2$, i960;
Frank M. McDade, Director, Jirectorate of Contract Administration
Defense Contract Administration Services Regional Office,
Chicago, January 23, 1967; Peter J. Thomas, Chief, Price/Cost
Analysis Branch, Jefense Contract Administration Services
Regional Office, Chicago. January 24, 1967; Herbert Fisher, Chief
Financial Services Division, Defense Contract Administration
Services, Alexandria, January 27, 1967.
^Interview with Herbert L. Fisher. Chief, Financial Services
Division, Jefense Contract Administration Services, Cameron
Station, Alexandria, January 27, 1967.
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to making awards, ana when possible, while structuring the
incentive provisions since they may outweigh the profit incentive
and would override the control incentives. This is especially
important when making trade-off analysis* Jy limiting the
function of the incentive contract to the profit incentive, its
purpose can be understood more readily, and its effectiveness
can be evaluated more explicitly.
ie use of incentive contracts has greatly increased since
March 1962 when the Armed Jervices Procurement Regulation was
revised. ^-0 This change restates the rules governing the
selection of the proper type of contract including the applica-
tions ana limitations of each type. During the last four years
there has been a substantial increase in the use of incentive
contracts in defense procurement as shown in the following
statistical analysis:






Cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFi^) 21. 2^ U.5$ ?.V>
Cost-plus-incentive-fee (CUF) .1% 4.5% 9.1%
Fixod-Price-Incentive (FPI) 16.9% 16.5* 24.
Other Types 6l.d% 64.8% 57.2%
»Fir3t quarter FY 19^7.
Jince there are various types of incentive contracts used
by the department of defense, the author has limited discussion
to a multiple incentive type contract in part of Chapter II,
l°Kevision B to the 19o0 edition of A3PR.
l^U. 3. Department of the Navy. Heaaquarters, Naval Material
Command, purvey of 1 rocurement Statistics . NAYMAT P-4200, June-




followed by a straight cost fixed-price-incentive contract in
subsequent discussion* A multiple Incentive type contract was
chosen for illustrative purposes since it encompasses most
contractual aspects of quantitative analyses within the scope
of pre-planning the negotiation session* A straight cost
fixed-price-incentive contract was selected since it would be
the next most logical consideration in the event a firm-fixed-
price contract could not be negotiated due to questionable
aspects of the specifications or cost reliability. Additionally,
a fixed-price-incentive contract, restricted to a straight cost
incentive without aelivery and performance incentives simplifies,
for illustrative purposes, juat how incentive contracting can
provide the needed flexibility so often needed to reach an
agreement
•
However, discussion of four of the major types of contracts,
presented in the order of greatest risk to the contractor, is
considered to be appropriate before proceeding further in order
to provide the reader with an overall perspective of the
government v s desires and limitations for the general types of
contracts involved* Additionally since a fixed price incentive
contract is to be used in subsequent liscussion, it will serve
to clarify that particular type of contract's relationship wit
tne others.
Firm-Fixed-? rice Contracts
A firm fixed-price contract is an agreement to pay a
specified price when the items called for by the contract have
been uelivered and accepted. Normally, there is no price
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adjustment made for the work after the contract has been
awarded, regardless of the contractor's actual cost experience
in performing it* The contractor /*as assumed all financial
risks of performance and his profits depend entirely on nis
ability to control costs. The government does not bear any of
the contractor's rink of loss under the contract with the
implication being that the contractor is provided with the
maximum incentive to avoia waste and to use production and/or
subcontracting methods that will result in savings to labor and
material costs* The government particularly favors this type
of contract since it is relatively easy and inexpensive to
administer. 12 Additionally, there is no necessity for the
government to monitor the contractor's costs so that he does
not have to conform his accounting procedures to LOD audit
procedures. This results in lowering his administrative costs
and ultimately the government's cost of contracting.
This type of contract, when negotiated and not formally
advertised, is appropriate if any of the following conditions
exist: historical price comparisons can be made; available
cost or pricing data permit realistic estimates of probable
performance costs; or contract performance uncertainties can be
so clearly identified that their impact on price can be
evaluated. If none of these conditions exist, the use of
l^Armed Services Procurement Reflation, ihe 1963 Edition ,
jn: U. 3. Government Frintin- Office, 19&3, -Washin,
Hereafter cited as "ASPR".
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incentive features may be appropriate.^ However, there is
often a very fine line of interpretation as to what is " clearly
defined" or what constitutes a "realistic" estimate of probable
performance costs between tho government and contractor
negotiators. This is where incentive contracting may provide
the flexibility necessary to negotiate, provided that the
government negotiator believes there is some merit to the
contractor's reluctance to bargain further.
During the first quarter of fiscal year 19^7, firm-fixed
price contracts accounted for 47«6> or *1.6 billion of the
total direct purchases made in the Navy, while fixed-price
incentive contracts accounted for 7k kt or 4 793 million
dollars. 1^ While FFP contracts are highly desirable, it is
not always possible to negotiate, i'ne next logical
consideration for the contracting officer is the FPI contract.
Fixed-Price-Incentive Contract
Unlike the FFP contract, a FPI contract involves the
negotiation of more than the one element of total price. The
following elements of a FPI contract must be negotiated by the
government and the contractor before awarding the contract .15
13lbid .
arvey of Procurement istics, op. cit. . pp. 20-21.
15lncentive Contracting Quids, op. cit. . ; p. A-5«
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Target Cost (TC) - against which final costs
are measured.
Target Profit - a reasonable profit for
the work at target cost.
Ceiling Price (CP) - the total dollar amount
for wuica the government
will be liable.
Sharing Arrangement (3A) - the arrangement for
establishing final
profit and price.
The government and the contractor negotiate the final costs of
the contract, sharing the overruns or underruns according to the
agreed-upon arrangement, after the work is completed. Using a
simple illustration, assume that a target cost for a contract
ia $100, the target profit is >10, the ceiling price is $120
and the sharing arrangement is 80% (government) and 20£
(contractor). Under this arrangement, the contractor would
keep 20jC of every dollar saved. To earn a profit of $11,
therefore, he would have to reduce costs by t5 below target
cost ($10 -I- 20£ X $5). If he overran by more than £20, he
would lose money, since there is no minimum profit guaranteed
in this type contract. Therefore, no matter what the final
cost to the contractor, he must meet the contractual
specifications, and the government's liability cannot exceed
the celling price of J120. 'or this reason the FrI contract
should be used in preference to any cost reimbursement type




Cost-1 lus-Incentivc- u>e Contr
The sharing arrangement is also used in the CI IF contract
and determines the amount of fee payable to the contractor on
the basis of the relation between negotiated target cost and
final total allowable costs. The main difference between the
Fl'I and CFIF contract is that the latter does not contain a
ceiling price but normally contains a maximum and minimum fee.
If the minimum fee is eliminated, the contract, in effec
becomes a "coat sharing" type contract after a certain point.
The CPIF contract therefore places lOOjC of the risk on the
government up to the total cost of the work, with the only
incentive provided to the contractor being the minimum versus
the maximum fee.
A CPIF type contract may be used only after it has been
determined that it is likely to cost less than any other type,
or that it Is not practical to procure the particular item or
service in another manner. This type of contract is ordinarily
used for Research and Development; when the work required
cannot be definitized completely and its cost accurately
estimated; when there is doubt that the work can be completed
successfully; or when the specifications are incomplete. 17
oQ3t-i lus-jrixed-ree Contracts
The CPFF contract type provides the least incentive to the
contractor to manage his cost and places 100> of the risk on
17i>efense Procurement Handbook, op. clt. . V, pp. 19- •

is
the government for the cost of work performed* The contractor
receives his profit from the fixed fee negotiated with the
government and this fee does not vary with the actual
contractual cost. In 1962 , the Department of Jefense confined
the fixed-fee arrangement to research studies and other
contractual situations in which objectives could not be
accurately uefined a l& When there is a strong probability that
develop. lent is feasible or the government has generally
determined its desired performance objectives and completion
schedule . th« CI IF contract should not be used*
Nummary,
The concept, process and organisation of procurement by
negotiation has been discussed in terms of providing an
opportunity for obtaining fair and reasonable prices for both
the government and the contractor, as an exception to the
preferred method of formal advertisement. It has been shown
that it is a decision-making process between two parties or
groups with opposed viewpoints who are soeking a formula in
which they will have an opportunity to optimize their interests*
The process of negotiation, in its broadest aspects, deals with
activities concerning fact-finding, analysis, planning*
communication and strategy which are interrelated with the
parties* personal skills, attitudes and teamwork* The





determines the level of performance in rcacning reasonable
solutions*
Incentive contracting has been introduced as a tool of
negotiation* A negotiation technique which, when related to the
concept, process and organisation of procurement by negotiation,
may indicate how incentive contracting can provide the means for
negotiating an agreement whereby both parties have the
opportunity for optimising their interests.

CHAPTER II
PREPARATION FOR Ai. ANNINO THE NEGOTIATION 10*
Al^^yji^ <»*>• * rocurement situation
iwny procurement can be evaluated as Deing successful in
relation to the situation in wuicn it is accompli snea. When
preparing for the session in which the terms of the contract
are determined, the team needs to make sure that the procurement
situation is well analyzed* Post contract evaluation will be
the ultimate judge of effectiveness in pre-planning the
procurement situation*
Some of the factors affecting the procurement situation
are the nature of the product, the state of the arts, the
importance of time and the availability of information.
Economic factors such as expansion or contraction of over-all
economic activities, degree of competition, availability of
resources or skilled manpower, the peculiarities of an industry
and peculiar prouuction problems are also pertinent
considerations* *
Negotiators need not know the technical aspects of the
prouuct to any extent, but they should know the characteristics
Mi, 3. Jepartment of the Navy. Jefense Procurement
Management Course
.





of the product, its design and performance characteristics,
similarities and differences when compared to other products*
The more thorough the knowledge of the product, the more
effective the negotiation concerning it can be. "hen a
procurement situation calls for the time element as being of
prime Importance, the cost elements based on past performance
under ordinary circumstances become less useful as guides for
pricing. 2
The awareness of negotiating under conditions of economic
contraction for the economy as a whole or for the inauatry
presents different problems and bargaining advantages or
disadvantages as compared to a condition of expansion.
Every procurement situation has a historical sequence
which gave rise to the present situation. To understand the
present circumstances, a negotiator must know what agreements
have been made in the past concerning the items under
consideration. Precedence is a powerful force in deciding
Issues although it need not be the deciding force.
3
In each of the circumstances which becomes a part of the
procurement situation the buying team must analyse these
factors. Definite information concerning them may not be
available out in each case judgment can be uned as to their
effect. The factors of the procurement situation are facts
2lnterview with Peter J. Thomas, Chief, Trice/Cost
Analysis branch, Defense Contract Administration Services
Regional Office, Chicago, January 24, 1967.
3A3PR . par. 3-307.2.
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which must oe used by the negotiator.
Analysis of the Contractor's tropo—,1
.e bid proposal is a contractor's response to the buyer's
request, ihe respondent to such a request faces a dilemma when
constructing his proposal. It must be low enough to be chosen
as a candidate for negotiation and yet high enough to be used
as his initial position for negotiation purposes* An analysis
of the procurement situation will reveal the extent of
competition each respondent faced when working up his proposal
.
In the case of initial procurement a contractor is often
willing to submit a proposal below estimated cost with the hope
of being in a favorable position for subsequent follow-on
contracts. If the intent in such a situation is obvious, it
may become necessary to choose one or several companies on
another basis than price.
Even though a cost breakdown is required in a request for
proposal, it is seldom a truly estimated cost breakdown. Every
proposal is the result of a decision in strategy, for every
submitter faces the question, "How low must I ,;o to receive an
invitation to negotiate?". The answer to this question is as
much a result of what a submitter believes his competitor's
costs to be as his own. If the submitter has a real cost
advantage over competitors, his proposal will reflect a position
which he believes to be in the next most favorable cost
advantage.
When requesting cost information for a proposal, the
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request should be in sufficiently detailed breakdown so that
unreal estimates can be detected. ^ The quantity of information
requested may be judged on the basis of this standard. Any
information required beyond what is necessary to meet this need
is excess.
Since by far the greater share of military dollars are
spent on contracts which require a high degree of cost analysis,
it is of utmost importance to have sufficient cost information.
For example, in the first three months of fiscal year 1967
there were 10,034 negotiated actions out of 734*552 which
represented approximately $2.4 billion out of a total amount of
43*4 billion for all of the direct procurement actions within
the Department of the Navy. 5 The need is not only that of
obtaining historical cost data but there is a distinct need to
apply the skill of projecting costs realistically so that a
proposed cost may be judged critically. Regardless of the type
of contract employed, it is the skill of good cost estimating
which will, in the end, determine how reasonable a price was*
Input Available from uCAA and DCAS
There are two basic manuals which provide for all of the
services available from these two activities: Contract
Administration Manual for Contract Administration .Services,
USAM 8105.1 and the Oefense Contract Audit Agency Manual,
DCAAM 7640.1. Assuming hypothetical bid proposals were received
^Ibid. . par. 3-807.3.




in response to the request for proposals , the contracting
officer would initiate certain actions.
First, he would review the bid proposals and analyse than.
Those which were considered to be unresponsive to the data
requested, unrealistic, or responsive but too high in relation
to the others received, would not normally be considered for
further analysis.
Second, assuming the bid proposals exceeded £100,000, he
may decide to send the bid proposals with all supporting
documentation to the Administrative Contracting Office of the
Defense Contract Administration Services Regional Office located
in the appropriate geographical areas of the contractors.
Simultaneously, a copy of the bid proposals would be sent to
the Defense Contract Audit Agency Regional Offices responsible
for that particular contractor. He would specify to both
activities exactly which areas of the proposals he desired
analyzed, that is, cost analysis, financial capability analysis,
price analysis, technical evaluation, quality assurance or
property evaluation. He also would establish the deadline due
date. The price/cost analyst at DCASR becomes the coordinator
between jCAA and the internal components of the DCASR such as
the production, legal, quality assurance or plant property
specialists. Most of these specialists would conduct their
analysis in the contractor's plant, reviewing actual records,
°U. J. Department of defense, Jefense Supply Agency,






filea and holding Interviews as require .
Such DCAA/DCA3R coordination results in an audit report
incorporating written technical findings (tecnnical reports are
quantitatively oriented - not dollar recommendations) as to the
government's position regarding the cost breakdown submitted by
the contractor* The price analyst then reviews the audit and
technical reports and performs a price analysis.
Since DCAA and DCASR offices are located near and often
service the same contractors on a repetitive basis, a knowledge
of the contractor's accounting system, delivery ability and
past performance is developed which becomes a valuable aid in
performing price/cost analysis. Additionally, comparative
price/cost uata may be available from other contractor's
involved in the same industry located in the same geographical
area. More realistic learning curves, for example, may be
projected by the use of this knowledge* The price analyst must
consider and Justify all known factors in making his covering
recommendations to the Procurement Contracting uffice (PCu),
including the economic factors pertaining to the industry as a
whole as well as the local geographical conditions.
?
The package submitted back to the I CO should contain all
technical reports, the audit report and the covering price
analysis report. The price analysis report should recommend a
total cost to the government and may, if requested, provide a
profit percentage based upon the risk factors inherent in the
?Interviaw with Peter J. Thomas, January 24, 1967.
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contract type utilizing the Weighted Guidelines furnished in
the Armed Services Procurement Kegulations.° If the request
for proposal called for minimum and maximum levels of
performance and delivery, then each level would require a
price/cost analysis*
I lanniru; the Negotiation Objective
oince every organizational effort must be planned in terns
of an objective, the negotiation team too must plan its
negotiation objective. Without one, the teas will flounder and
may settle for conditions which uo not optimise the government's
interest* Price objectives can and should be planned in terms
of definite dollar amounts which reflect the evaluation of all
the terms and conaitions of the intended contract*
The contract type becomes a major consideration for the
contracting officer. 9 Since the government is in the business
of buying specially designed equipment, it may find it necessary
to define many factors such as: performance goals, design
approvals, quality-assurance measures, test procedures and
schedule objectives* Each added requirement may increase the
risks, therefore the costs of the work* The contractor must
weigh these factors carefully in deciding whether to compete
for the job* Within certain limits, he may be willing to




9lbid* . par. 3-803*

27
the government to share the risk* This balancing of financial
risk and reward underlies the contracting officer* s choice of
a contract type*
| contract type is meant the pricing arrangement for
allocating the risks ana rewards of the work* The most
fundamental difference is whether the contract is cost-
reimbursement of fixed-price* A cost-reimbursement contract
requires the contractor to accomplish the work within the
estimated cost of the contract* If the work is completed
within the estimated cost, the contractor is entitled to the
fixed-fee* Fixed-price contracts are based on the reverse of
this principle since the risks of the work are assumed by the
contractor in exchange for profit* If he can better the price,
the reward is nia and if he exceeds the price, the risk is also
his* In any event the contract type is an item to be
negotiated within the various restrictions imposed by the Armed
Services I rocurement Regulations*
Basic guides to types of contracts associated with degrees
of reliability in the cost estimated generally may be expressed
as follows: 10
l^lnterviows with V.illiam J* Ryan, Head, Manning Jranc
,
Director Chief Naval Material, F rocurement, November 25, 1966;
Frank M* He Jade, oorute of Contract Administration, lefense
Contract Administration Services Ke^ional Office, Chicago,
January 23, 19&7t and Herbert L* Fisher, Chief, Financial
Services Division, Jefense Contract Administration services.
Alexandria, January 27, 7, confirmed the acceptability or the
Degrees of Reliability uy contract type as basic guidelines*
The basic guidelines were first proposed by Ralph C* Nash,
Incentive Contracting , as depicted in Government Contract






PfflTf* of ueliauiHty <ftfftrert Type
90> to lJOii r irm-Kixed-. rice
aO/« to 95% Fixed-F rice-Incentive
70> to 3» Cost-; lus-Incentive-Pee
Under 70> Cost-i lu«-:'ixed-?ee
If the government's and contractor's estimates of the cost
to perform any aspects of the contract cannot be reconciled to
within 30% of each other, those aspects should be excluded from
incentive considerations* The Kirm-Kixed-i rice contract places
100% of the risk on the contractor* Risk to the contractor
will decrease wliile increasing for the government as one
proceeds down the foregoing list of contract types*
The government team now examines the pricing package
received from the various DCASRs and it is assumed, for purposes
of this paper* that the lowest bid is considered responsive and
contractually acceptable* This may not be the case if the low
bidder's cost estimates are found to be incomplete, in error or
there is historical evidence of poor contractual performance or
delivery* The price analyst's report should recommend a
minimum, maximum and target objective substantiated with the
rationale used in the analysis of each line item of the
contractor's cost estimates*^ The PCO's negotiating team must
then review the total pricing package, resolving and
coordinating all questionable items with the DCAA/uCASH team.
xraae-
Assuming that the proposal in question meets tne criteria
^Interview with Herourt L. fisher on January 27, 19' .
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for using multiple incentive contracts, that is, (a) the
government has a definable, Justified need for improved
performance or early delivery and (b) it is possible to
accomplish these improvements within the existing state of the
art, then a trade-off analysis should be performed* This is
necessary in order to assure a balance oetween worth and cost
to tho government. A multiple incentive contract requires a
great deal of quantitative analysis in evaluating the contract's
essential elements of cost, delivery and performance. This
selection was made in order to emphasise the various
considerations which may become necessary in evaluating and
pre-planning the negotiation objective. However, discussion,
subsequent to this section on trade-off analysis will be limited
to changing from a FFP to a F i I contract in order to reach
agreement. The FPI contract will contain only one of the three
incentivised elements - cost, with performance and delivery
assumed to be satisfactory to the government at the stated
minimum in the contract.
Many techniques are available for performing trade-off
analyses, some being extremely sophisticated and complex while
others are relatively simple. Some of the more sophisticated
techniques are: (a) NA3A*S STOIC | lified Techniques of
Incentive Contracting) and NUHATIC (Nomographic Aid to Incentive
Contracting) teenniques, which require the use of specially
trained personnel, 12 and (o) the techniques developed by the
12W. A. Hagen, MQKATlC + co Incentive




USAF my for performing systems analysis by computers, which
should be utilized only on large dollar value systems
procurements. ^ The following is a relatively simple nine-step
technique which can be used by any contracting officer and which
requires normally available sources of information such as those
presented thus far in this paper, 14
1. I'stablish the target performance and delivery as
proposed by the contractor. Then minimum acceptable and msvlsni
feasible or desirable performance and delivery levels must be
established.
2. Establish the target cost for the target performance
and delivery, on the basis of cost and price analysis of the
contractor's proposal.
3. liStablish minimum and maximum probable costs for
attaining target performance and delivery. At this point, an
incentive matrix as shown in Figure 1 should be drawn.
4* Using weighted guidelines, establish, (a) target fee
or profit on the target cost, (b) maximum reasonable profit on
*3u f . department of the Air Force. The Evaluation and
^ uructurin,; Techniques of Kultij le Incentive Contracts . August
1 4 ,;his technique was developed by HADM J. L. Hows:
rector of Irocurement, office of the Assistant Jecretary of
the Navy in conjunction with a member of his staff, Mr. .illiam
J. Platser. It has been patterned after and is similar to the
one presented by Uarbridge House Inc. in efense Advanced
Incentive Contracting Workshops. Interview with V. illiam J.
Ryan, Head, nning Branch. Director Chief Naval Material,




Multiple Incentive Contract Matrix
Source: aveloped by KAUM J. L. Howard, Director of irocure««nt,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in
conjunction with a member of his staff, Mr. illiam J*
Platser. Interview with V. illiam J. Ryi arming
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The contractor should be able to attain the most optimistic
position in all incentized elements, at least at the outset,
so he will work towards optimal profit and will not make
trade-offs until well into performance.
Fig. !•—Multiple Incentive Contract Matrix

33
the minimum reasonable profit on the raaxi.ium probable cost. 15
From theao figures, a profit-awing effect-of-cost scale can be
drawn, in which target profit would be represented as sero
(neither award nor penalty), and which would look like the
goal post chart shown on the left side of Figure 2. 10
5. establish penalties and rewards for attaining the
minimum acceptable and the maximum reasonably feasible or
desirable levels of performance and delivery. These rewards
and penalties should be established on the basis of (a) worth
to the government and (b) cost to the contractor. Normally,
the worth to the government determination is made by the project
manager. The contractor should propose the estimated cost to
attain the minimum and maximum levels. If the maximum goals
are realistic and reasonably attainable, then these cost
proposals should now be subjected to cost and price analysis as
was the original proposal, Again weighted guidelines should be
used to establish reasonable profits on the total costs of
accomplishing the most optimistic and pessimistic goals. This
is to assure the existence of a sufficient true profit to
actually motivate the contractor. Now, the profit-swing effect-
of-performance and delivery scales can be graphically presented
*5in establishing reasonable profit or fee on less than
the maximum allowable cost, the contractor's fixed overhead
expense situation should be thoroughly analyzed in order to
estimate how much incentive profit is required to motivate the
particular contractor to reduce costs. Any bill in,; for
otherwise unrecovered overhead expense is as valuable as profit
to the contractor,





Incentive Goal I osts
Source: U. . department of Defense, Office of Assistant
jcretary of Defense, Installations and Logistics.



















*-> 4 rH O-H KJfl















V) V) I r-i ox






v> ea u u







« • t c»
C'-« • 8






-«»- >y 3 > •H
u >•• H © • cfl • O *3
• (4 o © C *J
t» n > o G) 'J •
cfl O ^^U« U
H H2 t*-o32 3 r-«© *> © ©
1r-i 3 tog ><h
fci ©Ho • o w •
1 -h n
•H .p O
^ 4 at cs p ©
*> O-H O
c*












h a.oij X © © •* V a.












1 » O-* oC s-a
u •H




a> © u * © *> s
« ^ w
1
• G G G

36
on goal post charts as shown in Figure 2.
6. Compare the deviation from target price (contract cost
plus fee or profit) associated with the minimum and maximum
levels of performance and delivery to the deviation in contract
worth to the government at these levels* ' These two
deviations, in terms of dollars, should be in balance • If the
price the government would have to pay exceeds the worth, the
range of incentive effectiveness should be cut back to where
price and worth are in balance • If the worth significantly
exceeds the price, the reward and penalty may be increased to
give a greater incentive* When the worth exceeds the price of
improved perfonaance or uelivery, an exact balance is not
essential. Any adequate incentive will be sufficient to bring
about the improved performance or delivery, and the opportunity
for windfall profits can be reduced. 1° The danger of assigning
17?ho "worth determination" concept has been developed and
expanded by Mr* Ira F. Kuhn, Jr., of B-K dynamics, Inc. The
evaluation of the worth to the government of variations frcei
target in product performance or delivery timing in terms of
dollars, is essential so that it may be equated with incentive
dollar rewards and penalties. The government must determine
the dollar worth of any significant deviation in these
variables, and the attainment of any goal* This worth
determination is usually expressed in terms of direct costs,
opportunity costs or savings, and alternative costs. Interview
with William J. Hatser on November 25, 19t>6, and February 24,
1967.
l^The opportunity for the contractor to gain windfall
profits usually can be attributed to either fa) the state of the
technological art having been significantly advanced subsequent
to the time the specification and proposals prepared, or (b) a
high reward bei ^ven for early delivery when in fact early
delivery naturally reduces cost and increases profit due to the




a lower incentive-reward value to the accomplishment than it
is worth to the government Ilea in the likelihood of there
being an invalid (low) estimate of the cost to attain the
desired level* V hen the net loss to the government for below
target performance or delivery exceeds the incentive penalties,
it is essential that the penalties be increased.
7* Calculate break-even or trade-off points and translate
these into a meaningful equation. The use of a *T n chart,
Figure 3 9 is a valuable tool for this purpose. In this
calculation, a fixed dollar amount of change in fee or profit
is equated to the amount of change in cost, performance and
delivery which would be required to effect the given change in
fee. For example, a $100 increase in fee might result from
either (a) a 1500 decrease in cost, (b) a 5£ increase in
performance, or (c) a 5 week early delivery. Thus, the break-
even equation would read:
|500 (cost) 5jC (performance) » 5 weeks (delivery)
This break-even equation is therefore a quantified value
statement and provides a built-in-instruction to the contractor
showing him how to provide the government with the maximum value
under this contract.
8. To assure an overall balance between the price to be
paid and worth to be received by the government, the rewards
and penalties are checked against the following equation:
Additional | worth to the ^oven -
ment of attaining all of the most Maximum | amount
optiuistic r.oals over target u of reward fees
Reduced $ worth to the government amount
of attaining all of the least of penalty fees
optimistic £oal3 under target

Figure 3
Break-Lven Points ("T" Chart)
Source: Jevelope^ iALM J* . oward, ciroctor of : ro curanient,
:iice of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in
conjunction with a met. :is staff, Mr* illiara J.
latser. Interview with '.Villiam J. Ryan, I lanning
Branch, Lirector Chief Naval Material, Procurement,






in /ee or Profit







Showing: That the change in contractor performance, Cost A,
Performance B. or Delivery C, which will net a given
change X in profit or fee.
Fig. 3.—Breakeven Points ("T" Chart)
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If this equation is in balance, the rewards and penalties
to the contractor reflect the worth to the government, and if
the target performance and delivery are worth the target price,
price and worth will be in balance at the parameters of
performance and delivery.
9* The realistic effectiveness of the assigned incentives
can be checked by computing the percentage of total fee which
should be allocated to each of the incentivized elements* This
check is based on the concept that the ratio which the maxInnsi
incentive reward or penalty assigned to any one incentivised
element bears to the total maximum reward or penalty assigned
to all elements, should be equal to the ratio that the cost
change necessary to effect that maximum reward or penalty bears
to the total cost change necessary to effect the contract total
maximum reward or penalty. This concopt can be expressed in
terms of an equation:
(a) Maximum reward or (c) Increase or decrease
penalty for cost, in cost to effect (a)
performance or
delivery m
(b) Contract total (d) Total increase or
maximum reward decrease in total
or penalty contract cost neces-
sary to effect (b)
The following exercises must be performed to make this
computation:
(1) refine the cost swing:
(a) deductions • R
Cost efficiency (maximum) - $ less than target cost at
target performance and delivery •

uPerformance (minimum) • | leas than target coat •
Delivery (latest) • | less than target coat » r
Total negative coat awing Cr 4 . r r K
(b) Increases 1
Cost efficiency (minimum) $ more than target cost
at target performance and delivery Ci
Performance (maximum) • f more than target cost
Delivery (earliest) $ more than target cost Di
Total positive coat awing Ci ii * Df • 2
(c) Total coat awing • - R to I
(d) Percent of cost swing allocated to elements:





(2) Define the fee swing:
(a) Rewards A
For maximum cost efficiency • Ca
For maximum performance level * i &
For earliest delivery « Da
Total fee reward awing » Ca + I a Ja • A
(b) Penalties - F
For minimum cost efficiency • Cf
For minimum performance level Pf
For latest delivery • Df
Total fee penalty swing « Cf * Pf t DC • F
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(c) Total foe swing +A to -F
(d) Percent of fee swing allocs ted to elements:
Performance * J p
n 14 Ua + Dfdelivery -
/t + p
(3) If each elenent of incentive foe is properly balanced
against the cost for attaining that fee, the following
equations will be balanced.
(a) Cost:
Penalty a j^ jj£
(b) Performance:
Award • ji • £*•




i enalty ^ « j£
(4) The percentage of the total incentive fee pool tliat should
be associated with each incentivised element of the
contract then can be derived from the following equations:
(a) The percent of Uie incentive fee h ool to be allocated
to cost Jr + til
Jr ui 4. Pr + jr * T

(b) The percent of the incentive fee pool to be Allocated
to performance \ r » :
1
t Gi t ir II t i-T 4- Di
(c) The percent of the incentive fee pool to be allocated
to delivery » jr wi
Cr Oi Tr Fi * Jr Di
If all of these equations balance, the incentives are balanced*
If valii worth and cost analyses were performed and
incorporated into the incentive fee structure, the incentive
structure will dictate that any trade-offs made will not lessen
the cost-effectiveness of the procurement.
i lanninp. Other \ ositions
Returning to tho contractor's hypothetical bid, it is now
assumed that the contracting officer is only concerned with the
target cost position as shown in Figures 1 and 2, the "most
likely" j-oaition. If reasonableness, itself, is a desirable
goal, then reasonableness may be judged on the basis of
probability of occurrence of such cost and thus form the basis
for the negotiation objective. 19 The most reasonable
expectation for a cost to occur on a certain level is when the
chances are as great that the contractor will overrun the cost
at thin point as that he will underrun it. This may be called
the "most likely" position or the 50-50 position. Since this
is the most reasonable position to take, it becomes the best
^%» 3. jopartraent of se. k; vices t rocurccient




The usual pries elements on which this judgement may be
made are direct material usage and prices, direct labor usage
and rates, overhead and general and administrative costs,
direct engineering and tooling manpower usage and rates, 20
There may be other elements depending on the complexity of the
procurement, uach element would then be considered separately
by the appropriate analyst and in each case determine the 50-50
point. If the direct labor hours for production are estimated
on the basis of a learning curve, the analyst would determine
whether a straight-line projection from historical cost would
represent a 50-50 average cost or whether a flatter or steeper
projection is more reasonable, 21 This decision would require
a careful weighing of the assumptions which each alternative
choice contained, but in each case the decision would be based
on an estimation of the chances of exceeding or underrunning
the estimate. The point where the chances are considered equal
is where the choice would be made. The summation of the 50-50
points for all the elements would represent the total cost
objective. When a reasonable estimated profit is added to the
total, the result is a price objective,
>en negotiating a price based on a straight fixed price
type of contract, it is usually essential to plan more than one
position, uther positions are necessary so that the government




negotiators may have some "bargaining room" or hav* the
opportunity to "feel out" tkt contractor tnrough the interchange
of information in the negotiation process* The objective is the
important position to plan with othor positions planned as
supports to help attain the objective.
Beside the target cost objective, the next most important
position is the n optimistic" or minimum reasonable price
position. It indicates the basis for the first counter-proposal,
if one is planned, and also shows the amount of concessions
necessary to reach the objective. 22 The distance from the
minimum price position to the objective is the bargaining space
the negotiators have chosen.
The minimum price position can be analyzed on the same
basis of reasoning as the target cost objective. It is an error
to believe that an arbitrary figure of a "nice low amount* is
suitable as a minimum position. The view is often expressed
that the time spent in analyzing an exact point is not justified
because the negotiator does not intend to settle on this price
anyway. 23 But the risk of an arbitrary ^rice position lies in
the fact that unless a position is a defensible one. the
negotiator proposing the arbitrary position may lose respect
when the opposition asks him to justify his position. 24 Once
22Hule, op. cit. . pp. 25-29.
^Interview with J. Thomas. Chief, Irice/Cost
Analysis Branch, tense Contract Administration Services





a negotiator has lost stature, it is difficult to win subsequent
points in favor of .lis position* The mininum point must
therefore be selected with care and due consideration for the
facts of the procurement. In this case the question may be
asked, "'.'hat is the lowest probable cost incurrence''"
.
It must be recognised, of courso, that the chances of
incurrence are far below the $0-50 level and that the
contingencies on which the probable incurrence of cost are
based are weighted heavily in favor of the buyer. Yet, it is
a defensible position* The government negotiator nay choose a
higher position than the lowest probable incurrence and thus
give himself a more easily defensible position* The point of
actual choice of the minimum may well depend upon how much
bargaining room a negotiator needs below his objective* If he
wants to give himself a 2%o probable incurrence, such a position
can be more easily sold than on the 10, v level*
To choose a "pessimistic" position, or the maximum
reasonable target cost, may be necessary even though the
negotiator hopes that he will not need to go beyond the
objective* Since the objectives of both opposing teams may not
necessarily coincide, in fact, it would be sheer coincidence if
they did, one or both teams may need to go beyond their planned
objectives* Then too, a negotiation may develop into a contest
of bargaining str ths* If this happens, the maximum position
becomes very significant, for it is at this point where the
negotiator chooses not to go beyond, and therefore represents
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a take-it-or-laave it , . 2 5
The maximum position, as in the cast of the other two
positions, can be determined on the basis of probability of cost
incurrence. The question to be raised in tnis case, to aid the
judgment of the analyst, is: ""hat are the chances of the
occurrence of certain contingencies and how high will the cost
level consequently be?". The negotiator may wish to use a 25%
level or one chance out of four as a guide. Ms level may
need to be modified by the consideration of strategic factors
such as the amount of withholding power of the government, the
urgency of the procurement needed and the number of alternative
sources available. The answers to these questions will help
determine the point at which negotiations would be broken off
rather than continuing, nlthough the goal of every negotiation
is agreement, not all negotiations should necessarily end up
with agreement, rhere are occasions when no agreement is better
than an agreement regardless of the original intention. The
government negotiator still has the responsibility to the
government to contract for air and reasonable prices. 2^
The Basic I ositions
When planning the three basic positions, the analyst's
working paper would generally include the following inforaatio: I
2 5lbld.
2oInterviow with Frank K. McDade on January 23, 1967.






rect Production Labor Hours XXX XXX XXX
Direct Labor dates XXX XXX XXX
direct Labor Cost XXX XXX XXX
Direct Material Usage XXX
Jirect Material 1 rice I er unit XXX
-ect Material Cost XXX XXX XXX
Direct Engineering Cost XXX XXX XXX
Irect Tooling Labor Cost n x; XXX
oduction Overhead Cost XXX XXX XXX
nglneering Overhead Cost XXX XXX XXX
jneral and Administrative Cost XXX XXX XXX
Other Costs (copending on
Accounting breakdovm) XXX
-* TffiTotal Cost Positions y.xl:
Profit XXX JC XXX
Total Price Positions Vlfi
The price element categories depend upon the accounting
information available or other convenient ways of categorizing
cost elements such as "Start-up Costs" or nMant Rearrangement".
The analyst should have supporting exhibits for each major
category with additional supporting analytical data where
needed. Since the objective is the most important position, it
would be best to calculate this column first, for it permits
the analyst to use a single standard of judgment, the 5"-50
standard, for each category of cost. When he has calculated
each position separately in turn, he has before him the price
range and the objective within the range. Beyond this he must
estimate the contractor's posi I and his probable range.
ince he already has a proposal froa the contractor, he
knows his maximum position, but the remaining contractor's
positions will remain niuden or unannounced durin- the
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negotiation session. However, it may be necessary to revise
the estimate of those positions as the government negotiator
gets a "feel" for these hidden positions as the negotiation
progresses.
In the planning stage, the iment negotiator there:





Ubj . . I .
±°1< Max,
(Dotted lines are positions unknown to the government
negotiator.)
From the seller's viewpoint the maximum would actually
represent his minimum and the minimum would represent the
maximum price concessions. For convenience the nomenclature
will be used from the buyer's viewpoint. If the two objectives
are closer or when they coincide the task of the negotiator is
thereby greatly simplified. Nevertheless, the task of each
team is to use techniques which will cause the other side to
move from initially announced positions. This requires further
^Interview with I eter J. Thouas, Chief, .ce/Cost
Analysis Branch Defense Contract Administration Services




The process of "feeling out" unknown positions nay require
taking other positions before the Live is readied. If the
basic approach is to be logic or the reasonableness of positions
instead of bargaining stren .
,
communications will be
based on tlie logic of the estimates and the assumptions made.
In such an event, it may be best to announce the position
representing the negotiation objective quite soon, since this
position is the most logical one. But i contractor is
likely to take stands based on his bargaining strength, it is
better to move more slowly to the objective since a jreat deal
of "feeling out" is necessary. In thi3 way, the communication
will be based on estimating the contractor's attitudes and
developing ways and means of countering the basis for such
attitudes. When bargaining strength is the basic approach, a
single jump from the minimum to the objective may be interpreted
by the seller as bargaining weakness. Or else it may indicate
to him that the government's o ~ive is r yet and that
further concessions will be forthcoming. 3, the basic
approach will determine whether additional positions should be
planned. 29
Reco,:nizing: Issues
Comnuni cation around the negotiation table is centered




negotiation would be unnecessary since the information would be
known to be true by both parties leaving nothinr isagree
with. It is therefore assumed that a good portion of the
information is subject to disagreement, and it is this
information which must be organised into issues* 30 Issues can
therefore be considered as information or data about which
people take sides, negatively and positively. At the
negotiation table opposite stands are taken because negotiation,
by definition, implies participation by people with opposite
interests in certain aspects of the contract, such as price*
If the subject matter of communication during negotiation
is mostly debatable information, it is extremely important to
recognize, and organise this subject matter in terms of issues.
Recognition, itself, may enhance the chances of success. A
list of anticipated issues may be made with positive and
negative stands selected according to the best interests of the
government objective. The team can now organise the information
previously gathered in support of the stands taken, listing it
point by point as supporting data under the various issues as
the following diagram illustrates:
30befense Procurement Handbook, op. clt. . IX, pp. 39-40.

52
Issuo: Direct Labor \ roductlon Hoori^l
Govt, Position : 500 hours
JuVportinj; viata :










Sane as in the past
In this manner, each issue can be organised and diagnosed*
When the cost analysis approach is taken to measure
reasonableness of a price, the issues will coincide closely to
the price elements. There may be instances where there may be
several issues concerning a single element. For example, the
manufacturing overhead may indicate an issue on the question of
the amount of overhead and another issue on the basis of
allocation and still another on the question of volume ,^ 2
An arrangement of issues in this manner will provide a guide
for the negotiator to follow when presenting his case, and if
space is provided to make notes, it will serve also as a progress
sheet during negotiation.
A careful screening job is necessary to make sure that
issues are realistic. Non-realistic issues nay creep in
unintentionally. This can be avoided if it is remembered that
^H. H. Kroeker, A Handbook of Learning Curve Techniques .
Ohio State University ilesearch Foundation, 1961.
3 2U. . -,ient of the Navy. Office of Naval Katorial,
NeKQtiators Handbook . NAV LXOS P-1001, March 1953, PP. 25- .
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issues are resolvable and that the definite decision can be made
concerning them. There are times when an accusation may have
the appearance of an issue. For example, if the government
contractor accuses the contractor of being a high cost producer
and the contractor denies it, it is doubtful that this question
could be resolved. It is also doubtful whether there is much to
be gained if it is resolved.
The more pertinent issue is whether the contractor should
use 500 man hours per unit rather than the general question of
being a high cost producer. By emphasising the important issues,
time is not wasted and usually this allows the details to fall
in line after such issues are resolved. 33
I lannin^: Strategy
Decision-making in negotiations is an area distinct from
usual business decisions. Business decisions are normally made
by people who are on the same team. Negotiation decisions, on
the other hand, are made while the organised opposition is
present in the process of decision-making. This kind of proce-
dure calls for strategy to promote favorable attitudes and
consideration of viewpoints held by one side of the two-sided
decision-making process. The word strategy may be regarded to
mean the out-maneuvering of an opponent by shrewdness or to use
someone else to one's own advantage. But it may also be used to
gain a fair and reasonable objective, and it is in this sense
that the term is used in government procurement negotiation. 34
33 defense Procurement Handbook, op. cit. . IX, pp. 39-42.
34ibid.

Jtrate^y in the use of issues should bo planned carefully.
One of the simplest ways of planning strategy concerning issues
Is to arrange them according to their relative importance. The
strategy then uay be to start with the least important issue and
in turn work toward the more important. Concessions, then, will
have been made on less important issues with the hope that fewer
concessions will need to be made on the more important. The
issues may be arranged and presented so that when a concession
has been made by the opposition on an issue, he may find it
necessary to make a concession on a point in the next issue in
order to be consistent. Then again, they may be arranged
according to anticipated ease of reaching agreement. Take the
issue first in which there is the greatest likelihood of
agreement and thus create an atmosphere of agreement and
cordiality as the team moves to issues in which there is
anticipated less probability of agreement,
A good strategy is a flexible one. 3 5 strategy in the use
of basic positions should also be planned. Three alternative
suggestions may be made with regard to the government team 1 3
revealing of basic positions to the opposition: (1) reveal no
positions, (2) reveal only one initial position, the minimum,
and (3) reveal two positions, the minimum and the objective, 36
If the first alternative is chosen, the entire negotiation
35lbid,
3°Interview with Frank M. McJade, Director, .actorate of
Contract Administration, Jefense Contract Administration
Regional Office, Chicago, January 23, 1907.
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1 roceeda with no counter-proposal from the government teen. The
strategy in this case is to work from the contractor* s initial
proposal and to ask him to justify his position* e
.
;ovornment
team's strategy is to counter the justification wi ie hope
that the contractor team will choose a more favorable position
because their first position couldn't be justified* As the
contractor thus moves from one position to another, each move
based upon the fact that he coulu not justify his previous
position, the government negotiator will agree at the point
where the contractor's last offer coincides with the government's
objective. This kind of strategy may work only when the
contractor bargains from a weak position, such as urgently
wanting the business or when the contractor considers the price
less important than the possibility of follow-on-procuremeni
.
This is usually regarded as nbuying in" and may be the
explanation for his yielding readily.
Un the other hand, this may be a useful strategy when it
is used only initially after which the government team switches
to another strategy. The logic of this strategy is to get the
other team to move off their initial position. After the
contractor has conceded enough to bring them at least within the
government's maximum position, the government team changes to
the second alternative strategy* This combination of strategies
may be necessary inasmuch as any concessions made from an
unrealistic position are unreal concessions* The duty of the
government team is to bring them down far enough until any
exchange of concessions represents concessions on both parties.
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The second alternative, revealing the minimum position as
the initial counter-proposal by the government is another
commonly used strategy. A counter-proposal permits the
Ooverament team to take the initiative because it gives them
an opportunity to promote a viewpoint and to sell a position
aggressively. Good salesmanship techniques are as important in
selling positions as they are in selling commodities, for the
same psychological advantages can be gained in either case.
an. though the counter-proposal is not the position the
government team intends to settle on finally, the better the
selling job on this position, the easier to sell the
objective. 3?
The purpose of the counter-proposal is to make it easier to
settle on the objective. It is a point from which to make
concessions, and the strategy of timing the moves and the size
of jumps from the minimum to the objective should be carefully
planned«33
The last strategy involves an element of risk for the
negotiator using it. The bargaining space he has given himself
is between two announced positions, and although the objective
is not exactly a take-it-or-leaye-it position, it is a position
to be defended to the end if possible. Since it is announced
early in the session, the negotiator must have a great deal of
confidence in this position. To the extent that close
3 7Ibld.
3^Defense lrocurement Handbook, op. cit., IX, p. i*l.
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estimating is possible and thus confidence established in the
position itself and the negotiator has c ence in his ability
to sell this position, the strategy may be a highly successful
one*
Several advantages accrue from the use of this strategy*
It diminishes a great deal of so-called haggling and struggling
from one position to another when both teams are really looking
for the one best solution. Why not talk about the best solution
from the very beginning when this is what is sought? When both
teams are looking for the most reasonable solution there is no
reason to take positions which are less than most reasonable*
When one or both teams are seeking solutions basec bargaining
strength then this strategy would probably be less effective*
The choice of strategy concerning positions can be
determined only after a close examination of circumstances* The
following conditions may enter into this kind of determination:
(1) the degree of eagerness by the contractor to obtain the
contract, (2) the attitudes of reasonableness versus the desire
to use bar,;ainin^ strength to advantage and (3) the personal
abilities of the negotiators*
The first strategy probably works best when the first
condition is present, rbt sec strategy would be more
appropriate when the second c< .on points to the non-
reasonable approach or when there is a doubt in the minds of the
)Vorrunent negotiators as t approach the contractor will
take as in the case of dealing with a contractor for the first
time* Initial procurement, as compared to follow-on procurement,
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also points to so of this strategy ev< ,ugh the
vornment iias dealt with a contractor previously. la ../
when, in the judgment of government negotiators, the estimates
are considered unreliable or the reactions of tho contractor
cannot be judged with any degree of accuracy, this strategy
provides the necessary bargaining space so that movements can
be made with caution. The third strategy works best when
conditions [2) and (3) indicate Uie approac reasonableness
and the abilities of the negotiators are such that tney can
proceed with a maximum degree of confidence* 39
39lnterview with Frank M« McJade, L] actor, orate of
Contract Administration, . use Contract Administration





A negotiation team* 3 objective, its diagnosis of the issues
and the position it takes prior to the negotiation session are
based upon the preliminary information obtained from the
contractor* s proposal itself and from the price-cost analysis
provided by DCAA and JCA8K. Although every effort for complete
clarification is made by the latter activities, such positions
or objectives may not be firm until an opportunity has been
provided to the government team to question the contractor
concerning the various aspects of the proposal or other related
and relevant facts* The questioning may reveal differences of
interpretations of the information, or it may reveal problem
areas which need clarification. Often this can be accomplished
by the government team through the DCASR representative but many
contractors may be reluctant to furnish complete information to
a government representative who they know will not be part of
the negotiation team* This may be particularly true if the
information was planned to be used as a concession later during
the negotiation session*
The purpose of the exploratory session, if one is necessary




objective .^- i'he ^ovornment team shoul tions and
discussion on the basis of meeti. is test. costs 9
for example, nay be understood only after questioning the
specifi I of production to be employed. Then, too, the
posal may not nave been clear on the proportions of cert;.
metals to be used in the construction of the item. I , the
contractor may have a fundamental misunderstanding of the
engineering or tooling required*
In t. jcess of arriving at the tentative objective prior
to negotiation, the government team should make a list of all the
areas in which there is any doubt. When information received
from government sources is inconsistent with the informati
received from the contractor, the contractor should be
questioned thor y on such points. It may be good strategy
at this staje not to reveal any differences of information but
is can be used most effectively as ators to show where
questioning needs emphasis. 2 An important area where
questioning would need special attention is that of discovering
the basis of assumptions made for the projections of direct
labor hours and rates, material prices, scrap rates or overhead
rates.
Care should be taken that the questioning does not lead to
lu
• . .epartment of Jefens..*, i'ense -- :~rc :-,wu~ Handbook
U. 3. Army FM 3*-3, "• 3. Navy NAVMAT P-12U0, ' • - ^ 'ore
AFP 70-1-6, Defenso Jupply Agenc> I U05.1, 1 July 1965, IX,
p. 40.
2Gordon Wade Rule, "The Art of Negotiation", (unpublished,
private printing 1962), pp. 20-21*.
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argumentation, for to do so would destroy the purpose of the
exploratory session. It is also very important not to reveal
the negotiation team's pre-negotiation position, otherwise it
might be difficult or embarrassing to change positions following
the exploratory session. The same principle holds true when
making statements to othor government personnel* Strong
statements may be occasionally made by members of the buying
team when anticipating negotiations with a certain company; 3uch
statements, when made, have the effect of "taking a stand" which
may be entirely unrealistic when all facts are known and would
then represent a point from which retreat may require a lot of
explaining. If a team wishes to reveal its pre-negotiation
position to other government personnel, it should be clear that
such a position is only a tentative one. If this is not done
there may be a temptation to take the easier course and adopt
the tentative position in spite of its boing unrealistic .3
The length of the exploratory session may depend entirely
on the amount and type of information needed. As previously
mentioned, there may be occasions when no exploratory session is
necessary. After receipt of the contractor's proposal and the
subsequent receipt of the pricing package from DCA3R, further
clarification may not be required. A thorough price-cost
analysis reduces the amount of time necessary during the
negotiation session in fact-finding, on the other hand, the
^Interview with Peter J. Thomas, Chief. I rice/Cost Analysis
Branch Jefense Contract Administration Jervices aegional Office,
Chicago, January 24, 1967.
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exploratory session nay well occupy half the negotiation time*
This would hold true when specifications are not very clear or
when the contractor's proposal contains items which are not
properly supported* It may also occur when the proposal differs
substantially from facts ;atherea in the pre-planning phase from
DCAA and DCASR.^ In any event, this part of the session should
continue until there is a meeting of the minds concerning the
facts of the case* Without this common understanding of the
facts, neither the position nor the objective for negotiation
can be realistic*
The basic communication skill ciurlnc the exploratory
process is questioning, probing, listening and understanding*
Since human beings are involved in communication, variations are
necessary to meet the human need* In some cases it may be
advisable to plan questions in detail, as in the case of an
interview, until all information is obtained* In other
instances the non-directed interview approach may be used to
advantage* The questions in this case are broad but designed
to stimulate broader responses* This technique, when used in
negotiations, may often produce more information in the form of
unsolicited answers than the detailed questioning method* The
method to be chosen depends on the personality of the person to
whom tho questions are directed and the ability of the





When questions receive vague or guarded answers, it may be
necessary to use a probing technique whereby a series of
questions concerning the same subjoct natter are asked with each
successive question digging deeper in order to solicit an
adequate answer. Probing may also include the different
approaches or ways of asking the question* If the answer is not
satisfactory, ask it in another way, use different approaches,
postpone it for a while and phrase the question differently
until adequate answers are forthcoming—or else know why an
adequate answer is not given.
Listening is as vital to communication as talking.
Inadequate communication may often be attributed to inadequate
listening, perhaps more often than insufficient talking. In
the exploratory session the art of listening is of special
significance. It is that part of the negotiation in which the
vernnent negotiator's chief occupation is to listen and absorb
answers. Perhaps the negotiator may feel subconsciously that he
has lost the initiative when he isn't talking, but his
initiative may be assured by his directing the questions*'
Unintentional disputes may occur frequently because of a
lack of understanding. One approach or technique of assuring
the understanding of a point is to rephrase it or by asking
Slbid.
"Defense Procurement Handbook, op. cit. . IX, p. 40.
7lnterview with Peter J. Thoaas, January 2U t 1967.

whether hie understanding is correct. Meanings or differences
of interpretation by negotiators may cause by-passing the
intended meaning and thus common understanding is not achieved*
When prejudices held by negotiators cause lack of understanding,
it must be realized that biases of this kind should be set aside
deliberately in oruer to acnieve understanding, x'his is not an
argument in favor of accepting the opposition's viewpoint but
rather that of understanding it. For without tnis understanding
,
a viewpoint may be hard to counter effectively and it may lead
to fruitless and unintentional arguments*
°
As a natter of reminder and emphasis, the exploratory
session is strictly exploratory. In the process of questioning,
there may be a strong temptation to counter a contractor's
position as he explains it. But to do so would probably destroy
the purpose of exploration. The negotiator may suddenly find
himself in tne midst of negotiation when his intentions were
only fact-finding. Phil may also produce the additional danger
of beinj disorganized in his approach because he finds himself
inadvertently negotiating points wnich were planned to be used
later. Also, he may forget to pursue the remainder of the
exploration from the point where negotiation began. Therefore,
the negotiator will have lost in two respects; his negotiation
approach becomes disorganized and his exploration is incomplete*^





vernment negotiators have accomplished their purpose. They
should have (1) tested the realism of the issues and positions
planned in the pre-negotiation planning period, (2) determined,
by the many questions asked, the basis for the contractor's
position, and (3) determined the contractor's probable stand to
be taken on Issues and the relative importance he is likely to
place on each. 10 When this purpose has been accomplished a
recess is then in order so that the team can re-assess positions,
issues and strategy. The exploratory session has offered the
government negotiator the advantage of a testing ground before
actual negotiations, which should enable him to enter it with a
higher degree of confidence.
Conducting the Negotiation Session
Since the negotiation session is essentially a conference,
it should, like all conferences, have an agenda. The content of
proposals or counter-proposals determine the agenda of a
negotiation conference, but the order of procedure is dependent
upon the strategy chosen beforehand. 11 The choice of the agenda
items should, of course, be the responsibility of both teams and
it follows that each should make sure its agenda items are
considered. However, the chief negotiator for the government
should assume a special responsibility for leadership of the
conference as a whole. Since the government initiated the
^Defense Procurement HanaDook, op. cit. t IX, . p. 40-42.
Hjefense Procurement Handbook, pp. cit. . IX, pp. 39-41.
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procurement and invited the contractor to attend the conference,
the government team is logically the host team and therefore the
leader of tnis team should assume overall conference leadership*
It is he who should take the initiative in novin;; from item to
item on the agenda and steering the overall course of the
conference to a conclusion .12 jt should be his responsibility
to make sure there is a meeting of minds on the nature of the
issue or problem being discussed and a summary of the results
before Moving to the next item of di3CU3sio .
Having completed the exploration session does not preclude
further exploring or fact-finding during negotiation itself.
Beyond the need for fact-finding, exploration during
negotiations takes on another meaning. At this point its
meaning is that of searching for a solution to reach agreement.
The entire communication problem is that of seeking possible
agreement areas or arrangements. The form of communication must
of necessity be that of argumentation and persuasion since each
side has an interest to represent, but beyond this there is a
constant search for arrangements which will service both
interests.^
nee all facta for the negotiators have previously been
organised in terms of issues and positions which are now
embodied in a case, the negotiation procedure calls for carrying
out Lue planned strategy in regard to the buyer's case. If the
12Rule, op. cit. . V, pp. 33-39.
^Interview with rrank M. McDade, January 23, 1967.
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strategy plan calls for a counter-proposal to be presented early
in the negotiation session , this position should be sold by the
use of the best salesman techniques the negotiation is able to
muster. 1^ The selling of a position requires the sane finesse
as that of selling a commodity. It is here where a buyer
borrows the stock in trade of a salesman and both buyer and
seller become salesmen of positions. To illustrate this point,
the following extraction from the Department of Defense,






-1 lacing the Other
I arty on the
Defensive
-Throwing the Blame







We've made concession; now isn't
it your turn If you persist
in this, we will write your
president ."
"How can you justify that posi-
tion- t now it looks pretty
fantastic to me."
"This would never get past our
ntract Review Committee—we'd
be right back here within two
weeks if I let this go by."
jam member takes an extreme
position on an issue, by contrast
to which the -love; actual
position (stated by the negotiator)
seems far more moderate and
conciliatory.
















"I don't t. ou realise how
important this equipment is to
defense of i juntr;, .
The bui] jf an issue on whi
the negotiator intends to compro-
mise, then use it as proof of
his willingness to concede, though
the other pa Able."
Availability of ti
depends on actual bargaining
position. use can greatly
weaken the position of the user.
Correctly used, however, it may
discipline and otherwise intract-
able company.
To restore communications control,
to dissipate an emotional atmos-
phere, :t-
able, to divert discussion from
areas in v. the user is weak,
to plan adjustments in negotiation
strategy or tactics, to analyse
progress of the bargaining session
to this point.
Make offer in terms of alternative
combinations of profit and contract
types, alternative combinations of
delivery terms, and so forth.
"Yes, of course ... but ... or
"Yes, for that very reason we
feel..."
3ome of the foregoing tactics are indicative of bargain
from a position of strength and may be what is needed in
countering some of the disadvantages of dealing with a sole
source contractor. However, those dealing with concessions,
alternatives and appeals to the emotion, merit particular
attention. Logic may be used to appeal to the sense of reason
while persuasion may be used to make it attractive to the
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•Motions as well* Creating a logical acceptance within a
favorable enotional atmosphere should be more conducive to
successful salesmanship*^"
Aggrene- ion of a position permits the negotiator
to take the positive approach instead of a defensive one* In
presenting his case, he may dwell on eccn issue separately to
snow the basis for his thinking and the reasons for the logical
acceptance of euoh viewpoints* When the Job of presenting a
convincing case has been completed, the opposition should have
clearly in mind the buyer-negotiator* s case and the base upon
which it is built.
Each argument, when it is convincing, produces an effect
on attitude:** 'or this reason it would appear unnecessary to
agree on each issu • The sun of as in attitude
achieved while presenting the case should be reflected in a
willingness to cliange the total position* The opposition may
not acquiesce on a particular issue, but the government
negotiator feels the opposition's position has been changed
through his perception of a change in attitude* It may now be
more appropriate to negotiate the total price rather than the
elements of price* -he opposition would not concede openly
may be adjusted in total price without the government
knowing to vvhich element the concessions were nade*^7
l^jefanse i rocurement Handbook, op* pit*, IX, p* 37*




arties who intend to negotiate do not intend to take
initial positioaj from whi refuse ,ve since the
willingness to iaove toward negotiation is always a prerequisite
condition for negotiation. OBdt parties take a stand on take-it-
or-loave-it positions, negotiations have broken down* Changing
position loss not have to imply a sign of weakness or a sign of
being illogical. It may be more illogical to rnaintain a
position tnan it is to move to another.- ough both
.es have spent a great deal of effort to sell their original
positions, it is clear that they cannot be maintained if
agreement is aesired. The persuasiveness of side*s case
presentation should prouueed some reason for .g 9 and if
•ach side were equally successful, reasons should be present f
both to move.
How to get the other side to move when should move is
a negotiator's dilemma. Here are two considerations provided in
which this may be accomplished: domination t gaining
strength or by compromise and concessions.^
;en a team comes to the negotiation : with the
attitude tiut the movement toward agreement must be done by the
other team, their most important tool is I st rer.
Their entire plan of procedure would probably be that of attack.




issues and emphasizing and building up their own strength. If
the seller, for example, comes to the table with this approach
in mind, the buyer may have no other ciioice but to reciprocate.
The situation then becomes a struggle for domination by both
sides* The attractiveness of the reasonable objective is not
the prime consideration any longer. It becomes the balancinr, of
pressures which cause movements toward a reasonable agreement.
If the balance is not equal the team having the greater
advantage is demanding that yielding be done on a sacrificial
basis. Sole-source sellers may frequently choose this approach
for the advantage it gives them. 2^
On the other hand, the government as a buyer may also be
tempted to initiate this approach when the government is the
only buyer of a company's output. Then too it may be chosen
because economic conditions favor one side more than the other.
It should be remembered, though, that domination demands
sacrifice on the part of the other team and to that extent does
not produce a fair and reasonable agreement. In the long run
such relationships would normally become untenable. The
government when facing a seller who has adopted this approach
need not reciprocate but insist on the reasonableness-of-cost
approach. Changing the type of contract may help the governmc
negotiators to accomplish this objective. In this event a good
selling job would be necessary on the advantages of a particular
type of contract. A special appeal should not be overlooked
^Defense l rocuroment Handbook, op. cit.
. pp. U5-L .
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based on the fact that public funds are being expended and
therefore the sacrifices demanded are taxpayer's money.
Compromise, by definition, means a settlement by
arbitration or by consent reached by mutual concessions.
However, if compromise is offered on the basis of arbitrary
position changes purely for the sake of short-cutting
negotiation procedures, it becomes highly questionable. This
may well lead to agreements which may not be satisfactory to
either party. Spliitin^ differences, for instance, is too
arbitrary. There may be no particular reason for the split to
be desirable. It should be remembered that the one who offers
to split the difference is in reality announcing s new position
of his own, and if the other side refuses to split the offer,
he cannot gracefully retreat from it. 2 * If the other side asks
him to justify his new position he may not be able to do so
since it is arbitrary.
Making compromises should be a more orderly process, for
it demands that every change in position has reasons for it.
The basis for compromise is in the issues on which the
negotiators have clashed. If the negotiators are reasonable,
they will have found ^ood reasons for position changes. In ths
process of clashing, the negotiator should be as much concerned
with giving the other side justification for changing as he is
in selling his own case. When both sides have done this,
concessions, then, have become a process of yielding to superior
21Kule, op. cit. t V, p. Uo.
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points of argument and therefore, logic. Communications, when
negotiators are ready for compromise, may take the form of two
teams offering each other reasons for chan . jositions. is
provides the basis for the search for the mutually advantageous
conclusion, it is based on the premise that both teams are
sincere in taeir search, but when this condition is present,
yielding positions is not meant to construe a sign of weakness
nor of being illogical* The chief negotiator should summarise
the reasons for the change when he is proposing a new position. ??
Here again, he should go back to the issues and show in this
context the logic of the new position. These notes will be most
useful when writing a memorandum of understanding before
concluding the negotiation.
The Hard Core of Negotiations
Objectives made by two different teams do not necessarily
coincide. When both teams have conceded to the point where
each has reached their objective, concessions from these points
are apparently going to be extremely more difficult. Since
objectives are not announced, each team does not know when the
other has reached the objective except by guessing. The
hypothetical negotiation situation may well appear as follows:







The shaded area represents the hard core which may be
difficult to penetrate since both have yielded by concessions
as much as tney planned. Negotiations may tend to become
stalemated at this point, and to prevent such an occurrence
there are several tnings negotiators may want to try. It now
becomes paramount, more than ever, that negotiators have the
attitude of finaing a formula or solution which will serve both
interests* The government team, at this point, may well
re-examine the realism of its objective and also examine
objectives based on alternative sets of conditions. If they
decide to use another set of conditions with another objoctlve,
it provides the possibility of making another offer as a
solution. Ftr example, they may decide to offer a fixed price
incentive type contract instead of a firm-fixed price contract
which represented the assumption under which the negotiations
proceeded thus far. The negotiator for the government may map
the positions on arlthmotic graph paper and would appear as
shown in Figure 4. '
33*'urtner information concerning arithmetic graphs used for
all typjs of Incentive contracts nay be found in the Department





Source: Arithmetic graph 3imilar to the type illustrated in
. Department of Defense. Office of Assistant
Jecretary of Defense, Installations and Logistics,





























Figure U indicates that the price objective for the
government at $11 million, estimated at £10 million in costs and
|1 million for profit. The contractor's objective was $13*2
million consisting of fl2 million dollars in costs and |1«2
million in profits* The vertical lines indicate only the cost
positions and do not represent price linos. For example,
proceeding across the horizontal line to the £10 million cost
and then vertically until intersecting with the 10£ profit line,
the vertical axis profit line will read $1 millio. . The
addition of the ..10 million cost and $1 million profit equals
the government team's objective. The same procedure would apply
in determining the contractor's position.
Figure 5 shows price lines in addition to cost positions.
Lines A and B are price lines when profit and cost are the
variables. These lines indicate wh«t the price would be on the
basis of a firm-fixed price contract where each negotiator has
considered a 10# estimated profit. Line A, for example,
indicates the price and profit adjustment for all points of over
and underruns of cost from the ; 10 million cost point. Recalling
that firm-fixed price contracts place 190/, of the risk with the
contractor, an underrun of cost amounting to $1 million dollars
would mean the contractor's profit would be $2 million at a cost
of $9 million. The original contract price remains firm at |
million. On the other hand, if the overrun were $1 million, the
price would still remain at ill million but the profit would be
sero, which the line indicates is the break-even point. .e




Sample Firm-Fixed 1'rice Contract
Source: Arithmetic graph aimilar to the type illustrated in
the I . . Department of Defense. Office of Assistant
Secretary of Jefense, Installations and Logistics,
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. 5.—Sample r'irnw'ixed Price Contract

the risk of overrun is narrowed to *1 nil lion before profits
become minus quantities. Line B measures the incentives and
risks of under and overruns from the contractor's cost,
objective*
During ine h&ra core negotiations, the central question is
that of the degree of certainty of the actual coat incurred,
when the contract is completed, to coincide with the predicted.
If the contractor cannot be convinced that the CIO million cost
objective will be acnievoa, it may be best to offer a fixed
price incentive contract in which the incentives and risks of
under and overruns are shared. As previously mentioned in
Chapter 1, the negotiation teams must negotiate four elements
under a FPI contract oefore awarding the contract; the Target
Cost (TC)| Target Profit [TP)| Qmiliag Price and the
Sharing arrangement (JA). Assumi .at the government
negotiator now desires to offer a FPI contract with the objectives
of breaking tnrough the hard core negotiations, he may offer a
target cost of ;il million with an &£ target profit, or $880
thousand, and a sharing arrangement of 75/25 which means that
75j4 of over or underruns are absorbed by the government, and
lastly, establish a ceiling price of $13.2 millio; . If this
were offered as an alternative, the price line would change to
Line C as indicated in Figure 6.
Line G measures the price at all points of under and
overruns from target. If t:ie ^overnnent team has confidence
that the coats are between &>£ to 95£ reliable and it is felt




3ample Fixed J rice Incentive Contract
With Skewed Confidence Li .
Source: arithmetic graph similar to the type illustrated in
the I . . partment of Jefenso. Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Installations and Logistics,
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moving the target cost to ill million may still result in a price
close to their firm-fixed price objective as the following
calculation demonstrates:
Millions
|10*00 Actual cost at completion
.88 Target profit
•2 Incentive profit
7XJ$11. l5 Final Trice
In the event there is a $2 million underrun, the final
price negotiation would be £10.38 million dollars:
Millions
| 9*00 Actual cost at completion
.88 Target profit
Incentive profit
vl0.38 Final I rice
The ceiling price, if established at $13.2 million, (uhlan
was also the contractor's last stated position) would be the
break-even point for the contractor. At this point he would
realise sero profits and additionally would experience 100, .» of
the risk for subsequent overruns.
Changing the cost objective from $10 million to $11 million
and thus submitting a new counter-proposal on that basis with a
different type of contract may be what is necessary to penetrate
the hard core of bargaining. The art of penetrating this area
requires the consideration of all possible alternatives to
determine which is best suited for the circumstances under which
costs will be incurred.
In the situation described above, the government negotiator
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realises that in the 75/25 sharing arrangement with a target
coat at |11 million and a target profit at $ .88 million, the
actual coat in the end will have to be |9« 826 million with a
consequent actual profit of $1,174 million (Point D in Figure 6)
to yield and end price equal to hia original firm-fixed price
contract. This calculation is based on the formula for the
price curve: Price (P) « Actual Cost (AC) Target Profit (TP) -
The Sharing Arrangement (AC-TC). 2/* In the problem as stated,
the condition to be met is that the price in the pricing
arrangement is to be the same as that of the firm-fixed price,
then P * |11« Target profit is *,* of target cost or | .68
million. The sharing arrangement is .25. If AC I, the
formula then is ^11 - X + .86 - .25 (X - 11). Solving for X
produces the actual cost of |9«826 million necessary to realise
the price of £11 million.
Returning to the same situation, the contractor negotiator
realizes that to accomplish his price objective of -.13.2
million under the pricing arrangement offered by the government,
the actual cost in the ewd would have to be $12.76 million with
a consequent profit of 4 .44 million (Foint I in Figure 6) in
order to yield and end price equal to his firm-fixed price offer.
This would mean that possible profit percentages anticipated by
the contractor would range from 3i£ to any higher percentage he
2/HJ. 3. Department of Defense, orfice of Assistant Secretary
of Defense, Installations and Logistics. Incentive Contracting
Guide, U. 3. Army FM 38-34, U. S. Navy NATHaT -^ "~ , ' . "•. Air
Force AFP 70-1-5, defense Supply Agency D3AH 7800.1, January 19,




If the contractor negotiator feels strongly about the
probable occurrence of a particular contingency, such as the
occurrence of a change in labor mix, the government negotiator
may resolve this by offering a broken curve or a flat portion
in the curve (FG, in Figure 6), based upon a 90/10 sharing
arrangement for this portion of the curve. This means that the
government shares 90£ of the cost overrun above target but only
for a portion, up to point G. Confronted with this new
arrangement, the contractor realizes that his cost occurrence
will have to be at $12*467 million with a consequent profit of
$ .733 million to realize his price of 413.2 million, bringing
his profit percentage up to nearly 6£« This technique is
normally used for CPIF contracts and should be avoided as much
as possible since FPI pricing should be dependable enough to
preclude its use* 2 * Nevertheless, it is permissible to use and
by offoring to share such an important contingency, may bring
the price to the point, where the contractor considers it to be
fair and reasonable* If the contractor accepts the elements as
offered by the government negotiator, the ceiling price, Line C,
would then be the broken line from C to F to G to H in Figure 6*
It is in the hard core area of negotiation where the real,
price-differing contingencies are ironed out and pressed into
an agreement which is finally suitable to both sides* If the





a reasonable range applicable Tor a FPI type, it may be better
to consider further alternatives such as fixed price
redeterminable types or perhaps a CPIF type* However, as
suggested previously, each alternative set of contract conditions
requires different objectives for the negotiators* Because the
objectives differ, the proposing of alternatives offers the best
means of penetrating the hard core of negotiation when otherwise
the negotiators had reached their objectives*
The flexibility provided by incentive contracting may,
therefore, provide the means of penetrating hard core
negotiations while still providing both parties the opportunity
for optimizing i ,air interests based upon reasonable concessions*
In the foregoing illustrations both parties have made
concessions, and both are striving to optimise their interests*
The government team in relying on their cost estimates believes
the end result will be close to or less than their original
firm-fixed price objective* The contractor* through concessions,
has decreased his original profit estimate, primarily due to
agreeing to share the risk with the government, but has the
opportunity to increase profits solely on the basis of his
efficiency, much the same as a firm-fixed price contract*
the Package
When a meeting of minds has been reached on the contract
price, it follows tiiat this price represents s package which has
wrapped up within it a reflection of all the Issues and
conditions discussed and resolved during the process of

*7
negotiation.*10 Both parties must have a clear understanding of
what is wrapped up in the price. It is, therefore, incumbent
for the chief negotiator of the host team to summarise, before
the final meeting closes, all the conditions and terms embodied
in the agreement. If the government negotiator has kept a
running account of the progress of issues and the reasons for
changes in positions, hs will have no difficulty in making the
summarization, Whun the other team concurs with the summary,
the negotiation is completed.
Since the proposed contract may be subject to review and
approval, the negotiator may be called on to reconstruct the
circumstances under which the agreement was made and to clarify
the intentions of the parties, A memorandum for the files would
be most helpful in providing such information at a subsequent
date. This memorandum may include the pre-negotiation plans and
the manner in which they were carried out during negotiatio- .
It should be a record of analysis of the planned issues,
objectives and strategy. It should contain the progress of main
points during negotiation, the reasons for changed positions and
the embodiment of the final agreement
,
2? The summarisation of
reasons for positions or changed positions is especially
important if a negotiator is called on to defend himself later.
After-the-fact critics may view facts differently than the one
looking at them before their occurrence, but if the negotiator




uis able to show why certain eventualities appeared to hi* as






This paper has examined certain aspects of the concept,
process and organisation of negotiation and its interrelationship
with incentive contracting as a negotiation technique or tool in
the achievement of fair and reasonable prices for both the
government and the contractor.
This does not maan to imply that incentive contracting
guarantees the means for negotiating an agreement in which both
parties will optimize their interests. Rather, it is the "how"
it may be done in order to afford both parties a reasonable
"opportunity" to optimise their objectives*
It has been shown that the negotiation process deals with
a multitude of intangible influences and alternatives, which can
to a degree, be minimised Uirou,;h quantitative analyses*
However, in spite of the quantification effort, which if misused
nay lead to undesirable results, there still remains a number
of intangible factors which are entirely dependent upon the
actions and reactions of the negotiators. This paper has
attempted to relate both the quantitative and qualitative





The approach uaed in describing the various negotiation
tachniquas has baan to stress logic and persuasiveneas, based
on the interpretation of data, in order to attain reasonable
solutions to issues in an effort to ruach an overall agreement.
By fragmentizing the proposal into sequential elements and
issues, the negotiators can systematically attack the overal
problem using reasonableness, compromise and salesmanship in the
process.
Conclusions
The hypothetical negotiation situations presented in this
paper liave shown how it is possible to use incentive contracting
techniques as means for negotiating an agreement whereby both
parties have the opportunity for optimizing their interests.
Its overall purpose has been to improve the reader's
understanding and appreciation for negotiation as an art with
the hope that tie will share in the author's opinion that the
following conclusions are valid:
hat reasonableness of prices can be assured in
negotiation only when established and applied by
reasonable men who intend to examine all the pertinent
circumstances of the procurement
.
-That negotiation does not assure but rather provides
the opportunity of reasonable consideration by
stressi I common advantages to both parties of
any proposal and linking these advantages in such a




- That the element of flexibility it an important
determinant in obtaining concessions leading to a
mutually satisfactory agreement ana that incentive
contracting can provide the flexibility needed under
the appropriate conditions*
- That the skills of fact-finding and data analyzati
are of paramount importance in order to negotiate at
an acceptable lovel of performance*
- That objectives be planned in terms of definite
dollar amounts which reflect ina evaluation of all
the terms and conditions of the intended contract.
When using incentive contracts the variation in total
price must be compared with and be compatible to the
objectives originally planned*
- That trade-off analysis, in evaluating th* contracts
essential elements of cost* delivery and performance,
is necessary in oraer to assure a balance between
worth and cost to the government.
It is pertinent to observe at this point, that the
Department of Defense Cost Information Reporting System now in
the initial stages of development is designed to provide greater
accuracy in cost estimating than has ever been possible before*
The negotiators will welcome any system which will improve the
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